Plotinus Commentary: Ennead 4.7 On the Immortality of the Soul

Plotinus makes fantastic points in maintaining that no atom nor aggregation of atoms, which in themselves have no soul or intelligence, could produce either soul or intelligence or further, that they could produce a sympathetic order unto themselves.

One faulty implication of Plotinus’ here is that he maintains a principle distinction and truly duality between soul and body, rather than a monic dynamic. He holds that matter is merely fashioned by, and presumably possessed by soul, and is therefore maintained as a composite of matter and form until the soul departs (being the unifying principle between form and matter, a glue) and the matter disintegrates. In reality, the manifestation (integration) and unmanifestation (disintegration) of material is a direct byproduct of the souls natural activity and dynamism. In simple, the soul manifests as formed matter, it does not possess and fashion extrinsic matter.

Matter is not cohesive because it is yoked by a cohesive principle, rather because it is spawned by a cohesive principle. Even disintegrative processes are cohesive.

Plotinus demonstrates that if matter, or the body in itself possessed sensation, the sense-object would be sensed by each part independently and there would be no cohesive perception of the object, though there is despite our senses being dispersed throughout various organs — we still sense and perceive through one overarching subject and can form a cohesive apprehension of the sense object in its totality, the apprehension is unitary. Therefore matter possesses no sensation. To prove that sensation does not occur by transmission to the directing principle from the given part of the body, Plotinus uses pain, if the sensation was relayed to the brain from the finger for instance, the sensation would need to be replicated in all parts between the two, and since matter is infinitely divisible, the sensation would be replicated to virtual infinity. Moreover, since the pain itself would be sensed by each part, the relay would no longer be of merely the fingers pain, but the pain of every part.

I’d like to comment on Plotinus’ position of intelligible things over sensible things, these are things such as virtue, beauty and justice. What this seems to mean is that these things in themselves cannot be objectified or rather, reified as an object in itself. What they are however, are intelligible natures that certainly express themselves in manifested form, as manifested form is in sum the expression of intelligence or Mind. Essentially, these intelligible principles are not subject to manifestation dynamics in themselves as they are not objective, they are subjective natures however and are therefore expressed in realities objectification.

Plotinus maintains that, “that which is potential could not pass into actualization without the prior presence of some actual (real) principle”, essentially a reality principle, and uses this to maintain the primacy of intelligence and the soul opposed to those things being a development from matter as posited by the stoics.

Though Plotinus succinctly demonstrates the flaws in the conceptions of the soul held by the Stoics and Pythagoreans, his own theorem has flaws. He admits a reality principle as above and as, “Therefore, the principle that possesses existence in itself and in a supreme degree will always exist.” And yet, he subscribes to an arbitrary dualist relationship between the soul and matter, and really subject and object at large. Plotinus holds the objective or material in extremely low regard and his wording implicates an attitude as though it were private from the subject, or soul (even universal soul), “It must live, and live with a pure life, as long as it exists within itself. If something of it mingles with what is inferior, this part meets obstacles in its aspiration to the good.” How can the reality principle intermingle with something beyond itself? That would imply that whatever it is, is real and therefore encompassed by that self existent reality principle. “Besides, this lower part of the soul does not itself perish, for it exists as long as the principle from which it proceeds. Indeed, nothing that exists is annihilated.” This same logic should apply to the objective, material world, but it is not given the same courtesy. The subjects nature of self objectification as manifested material is not well apprehended nor relayed by Plotinus, but since objectification necessarily happens by virtue of the subjects primacy and the existence of objectification, this nature must exist and it must exist as the subjects self objectification.