Plotinus Commentary: Ennead 3.1 Concerning Fate

In Concerning Fate, Plotinus targets both Stoic, Materialist and Astrological conceptions of causality. His argument against materialism is sound, that being the impossibility of the arrangement of atoms to form order in themselves, independent of an ordering agent, and the impossibility of such arrangements producing character in themselves over simply expressing that character. That being said, his position against the Stoics and the Astrologers have problems that I will rebuke herein.

“If in the universe there exists but a single principle which acts and reacts, if things derive from eachother by a series of causes each of which referring to the previous one, it will no longer be possible to say truly that all things arise out of causes, for their totality will constitute but a single being. In that case we are no longer ourselves; actions are no longer ours; it is a foreign principle which reasons, wills and acts in us.”

Ennead 3.1

It is very clear, as will be further shown momentarily, that Plotinus is concerned about the Stoic minimization of the individuated soul (of the Absolute). However, in criticizing this minimization, which is the Stoic anima mundi or psyche tou pantos, Plotinus seems to contradict his own emanationism and principles necessitated by monism (reality as a unitary system; monad). If there was not such a single causal power, or unmoved mover as Plotinus does believe in, then it would implicate causal powers beyond the Absolute, which is an impossibility. The mistake made herein is a crucial misunderstanding of the relationship between the Absolute and individuated souls. If the premise he rebukes were true, it would not be that we are not ourselves, just that we share in that one causal nature and sole subjectivity, and that we have misconstrued the relationship between both souls and eachother as well as souls and the Absolute. We are indeed that which acts and wills and has agency, but that agency is identical to that of the Absolute, necessitatively given that there exists no principle beyond the Absolute.

“If then everything follows the impulsion of a single principle, nothing is left for us but to follow it.”

Ennead 3.1

In sum, Plotinus maintains the human soul as an independent principle, particularly when disembodied, when embodied he maintains that the soul is subjected to external affections beyond itself. This is inherently contradictory for several reasons. First, the human soul cannot be principally independent from the underlying reality principle, even if it is a development therefrom, it couldn’t possibly dissociate from its nature. Secondly, the soul is admitted to interact with both bodies and the external world, so they could not be of contrary natures particularly when reconciled by a necessary underlying reality principle. Tying these together, given that a human soul is necessarily a conditioning from the Absolute, it must inherit its nature in totality, including its agency, subjectivity, and self-objectifying (manifesting; self-imagining) natures. It follows that sense matter exists, and it must be in a real sense the objectification of what Plotinus describes as an unmanifest ordering principle of sorts (the Absolute, or soul/mind/nous), there would be a dynamic of a subjects (souls) self-objectification intrinsic to reality, any individuation of the universal subjectivity, such as a soul individuated from the Absolute, must inherit this nature and share in that causal relationship between subject and object, between both the soul and its manifested body, and the soul and its external experience. It cannot experience principle foreign to it.

Against the astrologers, Plotinus correctly undermines celestial motion as a supreme causal agent, but he fails to understand it as supremely correspondent to all things in reality, besides admitting it can be analogous to events in the context of observing the stars to determine events, he even relegates a small amount of direct causal power to them. The reality is as follows, because reality is a self contained system, all things within reality refer to principle reality at large, therefore existent things refer to other existent things, this is self-referentiality necessitated by a unitary system — a correspondence between instances of reality within it. It follows that will the stars are not a causal power or agent in themselves, it is likely their motions and position will correspond in great degree to other instances of reality, which could extend to character and event. As Plotinus admits analogy between astrology and event, it’s likely he would agree, but his statements don’t holistically consider the apparent causal power of astrology or truly any divination as merely an observation of correspondence, and moreover an observation subject to error and suggestive power to actual causal power (the mind).