Plotinus Commentary: Ennead 5.9 Of Intelligence, Ideas and Essence

The Stoics are wrong in thinking that it is the Soul which, on reaching her perfection, begets Intelligence. How could that which is in potential pass into actualization unless there were some principle that effected the transition?

Ennead 5.9

Plotinus herein argues against something arising from its total lack, while totally correct — this astute logic can be applied against Plotinus in his own system of metaphysics. Plotinus makes it clear that the One (Good/God) cannot be reduced to either intelligence or soul, but, if it arises posterior to the One it must exist within the One, that is, the One must be intelligent and mentalizing. If the One is perfect and Good, then how could evil pass from the One? Surely there can exist no principle distinct from the One on the ultimate scale. How can beauty and good then be private as suggested by Plotinus if evil and ugliness are necessarily in the One in principle and effected into manifestation in materiality? Speaking of matter itself, it cannot of course be beyond the One ultimately, but more importantly materialization cannot be. This means the One must be both mentalizing and physicalizing. How could matter exist if it the mechanism back of its manifestation were not principally true to the One? These principles, though perhaps useful to categorize into hypostases on some level, even including matter as posterior to the three primary ones (Soul, Intellect and the One) — but each must be in the others. The One must be intelligent, mentalizing and physicalizing, and no natures of the One can be private, therefore the Soul will partake of the exact principle natures, though conditioned as a distinct (defined) soul.

Evils here below come from lack, privation, omission; it is a state of matter, or of anything similar to matter, which failed to be complete assimilated.

Ennead 5.9

Following Plotinus’ fair logic, nothing that comes to be can possibly transition into effect were it not present in the principle of the cause, more precisely, nothing can be beyond the One, the Absolute can be defined as that without privation. Therefore, any principle present within reality must be principally true to the One, including the mentalizing and physicalizing natures, the One is by necessity perfect and incorruptible by virtue of its absolution: nothing beyond it which can corrupt or imperfect it. Therefore evil and imperfection must only be relative, not an actual thing and certainly not caused by an impossible privation.

Things that proceed from decay are produced only because the Soul is unable to produce anything better in this case; otherwise she would have rather produced some object more agreeing with her nature.

Ennead 5.9

Here Plotinus puts forward what seems to be a common theme of hypostatic degradation, or emanated principles derived from the One degrading for some reason. How could the soul possibly produce something contrary to its nature? There can be actualization of the souls condition that coheres more or less to its actual condition, the manifested and objectified condition must reflect the souls condition. Therefore we must look elsewhere for the nature of degradation, rather than as privation of the Good/One nor hypostatic degradation. I maintain alternatively that the nature of the soul is to manifest a form of its condition, not totally unlike Plotinic emanationism/self-reference, but that formation/objectification much like thought, concentrates and deconcentrates, resulting in the manifestation and unmanifestation of a given form or body.