Monadology Commentary: Leibniz’ Plural Idealism

Introduction

Leibniz uses the Greek term Monad to describe a simple substance, which I will then describe as what is essentially a unitary system unto itself.

This commentary will begin with allowing Leibniz himself to introduce his ideas, with brief commentary, followed by an important development and exposition on the work at large with continued commentary and the introduction of my own concepts woven into the foundation Leibniz proffers us.

1. The Monad, of which we shall here speak, is nothing but a simple substance, which enters into compounds. By ‘simple’ is meant ‘without parts.’ (Theod. 10.)

2. And there must be simple substances, since there are compounds; for a compound is nothing but a collection or aggregatum of simple things.

Theod. 10.

Leibniz introduces monads as a simple substance, the word “monad” can be taken to mean one; unit or unitary system as used by the Pythagoreans. All of which are basically synonymous with simple system or substance, souls are a chief example of such a unitary system. I often term monads or souls as unitary systems unto themselves, so as to hint at their relationships with other monads and THE Monad; The One; God — which is also by definition a unitary system.

3. Now where there are no parts, there can be neither extension nor form [figure] nor divisibility. These Monads are the real atoms of nature and, in a word, the elements of things.

Here Leibniz begins to nuance the necessary natures of monads. What we call “parts” and “compounds” must necessarily exist, at least to the extent that would be necessary for us to observe them as they are, this means that there must be some nature inherent to both monads and the One by which composition appears. By inherent, truly inherent as well as intrinsic and internal are meant — this appearance of composition must exist internally to monads if they are indeed elementary, and the entering into composition previously mentioned by Leibniz must also be internal to the monad.

8. Yet the Monads must have some qualities, otherwise they would not even be existing things. And if simple substances did not differ in quality, there would be absolutely no means of perceiving any change in things.

9. Indeed, each Monad must be different from every other. For in nature there are never two beings which are perfectly alike and in which it is not possible to find an internal difference, or at least a difference founded upon an intrinsic quality [denomination].

Leibniz lays the groundwork for the following propositions to be put forward: if there was no qualitative difference in the conditions of two or more monads, they wouldn’t exist as multiple monads; all distinction in any external quality represents a necessary distinction in the monad itself. Two human beings for instance exist with an obvious qualitative distinction, necessitating a distinction in the monads underlying those humans. If there were no such a distinction, they wouldn’t even appear to be different, discrete beings, there must be a reason underlying even an appearance of distinction.

10. I assume also as admitted that every created being, and consequently the created Monad, is subject to change, and further that this change is continuous in each.

11. It follows from what has just been said, that the natural changes of the Monads come from an internal principle, since an external cause can have no influence upon their inner being.

Leibniz here maintains that although monads change, and more specifically, that their quality; condition develops, this change must be internal and not caused by the influence of an external principle — another monad for instance. Cause and effect in the terminal domain (the external world) cannot have a causal affection unto monads, given its not only a posterior principle, but a representative principle. That is to say, it is the manifestation of the conditions of monads as an image of sorts, a non-literal extension ultimately existent within monads. Ultimately, “externally” occurring cause and effect is nothing but the registration of monadic self-involvement as an internally occurring image. So, the development of these changes natural to the monad must be an effect caused unto the monad by itself, which we will term involution and involutionary movement, which amounts to self-involvement.

With this foundation laid we can develop this brilliant assessment made by Leibniz, of chief concern is the mechanics back of involution and perhaps more interestingly — back of composition. Composition at face value seems to contradict the inherent simplicity of monads after all, and it is again said by Leibniz that, where there are no parts there can be neither extension nor form nor divisibility. We understand extension and form to essentially be the self-objectification or the self-image of the monad — so it follows that a kind of composition internal to the monad is prerequisite to its extension as form, which is indeed, divisible — you can cut off parts of your body for instance. This could pose a problem to one reading over the work, but I’m going to offer a concise explanation that is tautologically necessary:

To progress, we will have to understand the aforementioned quality of the soul or monad to be its self-definition, its definition is what literally defines it against another, as though two black circles were drawn on a white paper. This definition would also determine the monads relation with others, for instance, two circles interlocked as in a venn diagram, with the middle colored to their relation, and the sides colored to their uniquity. As we have determined definition to be what defines the monad in relation to both reality and other monads, we can nuance our understanding of the monads self-definition as it’s condition, or quality. All conditions are definitive, all definition is relative, and all relation are those of similarity and difference in condition.

Therefore, the heart of Leibniz’ composition, being internal to the monad, must be one of conditions. This is easy to demonstrate in reality, we enter into and out of conditions all the time — we associate and dissociate with conditions, “changing” the composition of the soul. But in reality, it is merely the condition of the soul that permutates its composition, not that the soul in itself is actually a composite. It is the case that the soul has a capacity to memorize or retain information which forms its condition — not that the “condition” as a metastructure changes, rather the souls imagined; self-definitive “structure” changes. The changes in our lives can therefore be understood as the change of the soul’s association with monads, by way of either association or dissociation — both of which can be passive or active as though inertial.

Another thing to note is that definition is always composite, composition is immediately implied by relation which is immediately implied by definition. A monad alone in itself without any self-definition will have no parts, and no means by which it could relate with parts or defined monads. However, if a monad develops self-definition, it will immediately appear as though there is externality for the monad, as now there is something against which it appears defined.

Deconcentration and Reconcentration of a Monad

20. For we experience in ourselves a condition in which we remember nothing and have no distinguishable perception; as when we fall into a swoon or when we are overcome with a profound dreamless sleep. In this state the soul does not perceptibly differ from a bare Monad; but as this state is not lasting, and the soul comes out of it, the soul is something more than a bare Monad.

Theod. 64.

Deconcentration of conscious faculties is always followed by reconcentration, such a deconcentration is never permanent and the following reconcentration always references the subjective condition of the monad. This has an interesting bearing on apophatic practices that aim to uncondition the soul so as to “liberate” it from the suffering of conditioned existence, however, given we understand that the souls condition can be retained in spite of prolonged deconcentration thereupon, and moreover that the soul has an inherent impulse to develop conditions, it seems contradictory to necessary natures of both the soul and the One to suggest that it could achieve a prolonged absence of condition, for even if a “union” with the One is achieved, it is necessary that the One too has a conditioning principle, so it seems reasonable to assume that the united soul-substance would merely begin to develop conditions once more.

23. And as, on waking from stupor, we are conscious of our perceptions, we must have had perceptions immediately before we awoke, although we were not at all conscious of them; for one perception can in a natural way come only from another perception, as a motion can in a natural way come only from a motion.

Theod. 401-403.

You cannot reference a subjective experience unless it was indeed experienced subjectively, this is of particular application to supposed egoless states, which are nonetheless experienced subjectively irrespective of apprehended universality. This point of reference basically implicates egos presence regardless as to what degree that consciousness’ attention is removed from its own condition — hence why it always returns to those conditions, whereas a true negation wouldn’t be followed by this reconcentration, so to speak.

The Sympathy and Relationship Between Monads

51. But in simple substances the influence of one Monad upon another is only ideal, and it can have its effect only through the mediation of God, in so far as in the ideas of God any Monad rightly claims that God, in regulating the others from the beginning of things, should have regard to it. For since one created Monad cannot have any physical influence upon the inner being of another, it is only by this means that the one can be dependent upon the other.

Theod. 9, 54, 65, 66, 201. Abrege, Object. 3.

This is to the same effect as the propositions maintained by the American idealists like Goddard and Holmes, the independence of monads is inherited by the Monad, its self-containment is. All apparent affections from one monad to another is in reality a monad affecting the part of itself wherein another monad is — or rather, it is affecting the universal substrate from which both are derived and in which they both subsist, implying certain internal movements are sympathetic by virtue of the relation between monads (similarity in condition: how much of a monad exists within another) and with reality (the relational medium between monads).

59. …but he was unable to give any reason which could show the impossibility of this universal harmony, according to which every substance exactly expresses all others through the relations it has with them.

Omnis Definitio Est Relatio: all definition is relation. This is an excellent point raised by Leibniz, all particular monads within a universal Monad would be defined by their uniquity in condition (otherwise they wouldn’t be defined against other monads) — said condition would fit into the totality of conditions like a puzzle piece, since it is relative to them. What is the same they experience as relation both internally and in their objective, external experiences of reality — to illustrate, some people you share more experiential commonality with eachother than with others, and what is different is experienced as the variation in experience between them — which is ultimately exemplified as the literal difference in fields of subjectivity from individual to individual.

Association Between Monads of Different Scales

71. But it must not be imagined, as has been done by some who have misunderstood my thought, that each soul has a quantity or portion of matter belonging exclusively to itself or attached to it for ever, and that it consequently owns other inferior living beings, which are devoted for ever to its service. For all bodies are in a perpetual flux like rivers, and parts are entering into them and passing out of them continually.

The ontological scale of subjectivity, as going from completely universal subjectivity to increasingly particular subjectivities (or monads, aptly put) will be of use in understanding this. The more particular is shelved in the more universal according to scale:

70. Hence it appears that each living body has a dominant entelechy, which in an animal is the soul; but the members of this living body are full of other living beings, plants, animals, each of which has also its dominant entelechy or soul.

This can be thought of as association at scale, a particular soul’s condition is related to and subsumed unto an underlying oversoul, or a monad of greater universality — ad absolutum. One might wonder in regard to many worlds, if a particular soul might pass from one world to another, as a more particular monad within a human soul might pass from its dominant entelechy (the human soul) elsewhere — think of the monads at the core of bacterium even. It stands to reason that one soul would pass from one world to another given the condition of that soul develops such that its association shifts from one instantiation of reality as a world to another, as suggested by the likes of Neville Goddard.

Soul-Body Dynamics

72. Thus the soul changes its body only by degrees, little by little, so that it is never all at once deprived of all its organs; and there is often metamorphosis in animals, but never metempsychosis or transmigration of souls; nor are there souls entirely separate [from bodies] nor unembodied spirits [genies sans corps]. God alone is completely without body.

Theod. 90, 124.

First Leibniz refers to the principle by which the condition of the soul changes, which given its continuity and consistency, is gradual and by degrees that refer to former conditions according to the degree of change. Leibniz is of one mind with myself in the denial of metempsychosis (transmigration of souls), which implicates principle distinction between soul and body, and a literal movement of the soul between bodies. Because a monad has condition, and condition manifests a body, all discernible monads will indeed have a body — and if it isn’t discernible it doesn’t exist. Monads are the movers, self-movers even, but they are not moved.

73. It also follows from this that there never is absolute birth [generation] nor complete death, in the strict sense, consisting in the separation of the soul from the body. What we call births [generations] are developments and growths, while what we call deaths are envelopments and diminutions.

Leibniz here is a forerunner to my own manifestation dynamics, which entails a dynamic of periodic manifestation of form — of an unmanifest noumenal principle: a soul or monad, followed by its unmanifestation and continued manifestation in perpetuity. Continued manifestation is determined by the monads conditions, which is developed by its self experience. Likewise it is precursory to Walter Russells position on the periodic integration and disintegration of form (form of mind, thought) which has informed my own articulation of manifestation dynamics.

Self-referentiality

64. Thus the organic body of each living being is a kind of divine machine or natural automaton, which infinitely surpasses all artificial automata. For a machine made by the skill of man is not a machine in each of its parts. For instance, the tooth of a brass wheel has parts or fragments which for us are not artificial products, and which do not have the special characteristics of the machine, for they give no indication of the use for which the wheel was intended. But the machines of nature, namely, living bodies, are still machines in their smallest parts ad infinitum. It is this that constitutes the difference between nature and art, that is to say, between the divine art and ours.

Theod. 134, 146, 194, 403.

Here Leibniz basically says that organic manifestations of monads are fractal, it’s fundamental nature on the smaller scale being the same as its fundamental nature on the larger scale — its self-referential, the principle remains consistent and coherent across different scales.

65. And the Author of nature has been able to employ this divine and infinitely wonderful power of art, because each portion of matter is not only infinitely
divisible, as the ancients observed, but is also actually subdivided without end,
each part into further parts, of which each has some motion of its own; otherwise it would be impossible for each portion of matter to express the whole universe.

Theod. Prelim., Disc. de la Conform. 70, and 195.

Many Worlds

53. Now, as in the Ideas of God there is an infinite number of possible universes, and as only one of them can be actual, there must be a sufficient reason for the choice of God, which leads Him to decide upon one rather than another.

57. And as the same town, looked at from various sides, appears quite different and becomes as it were numerous in aspects [perspectivement]; even so, as a result of the infinite number of simple substances, it is as if there were so many different universes, which, nevertheless are nothing but aspects [perspectives] of a single universe, according to the special point of view of each Monad.

Theod. 8, 10, 44, 173, 196 sqq., 225, 414-416.; Theod. 147.

From here we can derive a very succinct explanation of the many worlds theory in a monistic metaphysic, this seems to be precursory to Chris Langans metaverse. All instantiations of reality as terminal domains, or worlds, would of course be contained within reality, and given the nature of an external universe being essentially a manifestation of an unmanifest primary principle, all instances of that primary principles manifestation would amount to varying perspectives in that principles condition, resulting in varying manifested conditions. In much the same way as two souls manifest relative to one another as two discrete bodies according to the variance in their internal conditions, worlds might manifest with relative discretion, being the same thing in principle at a larger scale. The many worlds in this case would fall under the same logic presented in line 53 by Leibniz, only extended to the self determined actualization of plural conditions at the scale of worlds.

A Priority and Tautology

44. For if there is a reality in essences or possibilities, or rather in eternal truths, this reality must needs be founded in something existing and actual, and consequently in the existence of the necessary Being, in whom essence involves existence, or in whom to be possible is to be actual.

Theod. 184-189, 335.

Here Leibniz contends that in order for eternal truths to exist as a kind of intrinsic principle or law, they must be principles or laws intrinsic to something, rather than disembodied and discrete abstracts that somehow manifest universally. They need to have a consistent medium of which they are a nature and through which their operation is enabled.

45. Thus God alone (or the necessary Being) has this prerogative that He must necessarily exist, if He is possible. And as nothing can interfere with the possibility of that which involves no limits, no negation and consequently no contradiction, this [His possibility] is sufficient of itself to make known the existence of God a priori. We have thus proved it, through the reality of eternal truths. But a little while ago we proved it also a posteriori, since there exist contingent beings, which can have their final or sufficient reason only in the necessary Being, which has the reason of its existence in itself.

Basically, Leibniz reasons that if there is consistent natural law there must be an underlying nature within which that laws operation can be observed, further maintaining that because this would be the basis for existence, its analogous to a principle through which potential becomes actual — i.e., a principle within which anything that can exist, does exist. To elaborate, in such a principle, anything that could possibly arise must already exist in potentia in that principle, something that comes into existence cannot change the principle of the essence that substantiates its existence. The reasoning then maintains that nothing can negate the possibility of an Absolute (that without limitations), as there can be nothing beyond it which can limit it, therefore it must exist. The reasoning folds into itself as an analytic position, or tautology (something true by definition), given that there must be an underlying reality within which real things and especially consistent, coherent laws might derive their reality, not to mention their consistency and coherency.

33. … When a truth is necessary, its reason can be found by analysis, resolving it into more simple ideas and truths, until we come to those which are primary.

Theod. 170, 174, 189, 280-282, 367. Abrege, Object.

Elaboration of Concepts Herein

Self-pluralization in Monistic Ontology

If it is maintained that a monad is not subject to external influence, then it follows that a monads apparent partaking in composition is actually a kind of self-pluralization, wherein the condition of the monad particularizes in a self-exploratory manner that creates a plurality of aspects within the monad that essentially become simple principles unto themselves, self-referent monads, that synergize within its higher scale system — creating a kind of composition. This should be applied to an ontological scale or ladder. Leibniz maintained the necessity of quality in monads, the plurality of monads; unitary systems unto themselves within one grand underlying reality system or “the One” would be a kind of explication or aspectuation (development of ideas/forming of aspects) of that primordial quality, becoming increasingly particular, and creating the appearance of compounds at respective scales — which would amount to the qualities of particular (non-universal) monads demonstrating their relations. It should be noted that relations would literally be one quality in another — how one monad is shelved within another. Therefore, their influence on one another need not and indeed should not be considered an external one, and the appearance of composition is explained to satisfaction as the explication of quality at scale.

To demonstrate the concept of qualitative shelving, an elaboration across the ontological scale will be made, from universal to increasingly particular. Any and all particular qualities share in the universality of quality, we could say they share in their quality of realness to avoid speculation at this time, but hereafter we have a foundation. Therefrom, we can say with certainty that all beings existent within this world share in that relation and any qualities necessitated by that condition, all animals including humans share in the quality of being animals, all humans, subsects of humanity share in the distinct quality of their subsect, peoples and cultures share in a closer proximity of quality, so on to members of a family amongst themselves, as a tendency. We need only observe the representation of this aspectuation and relativity at various scales to confirm this.

Aspectuation of Souls

The development of particular unitary systems unto themselves within an underlying universal unitary system as an explication of that universal systems quality, forming aspects of that quality much like a demonstration of it. A universal quality could of course be explicated and denominated internally as any conceivable quality. This aspectuation most certainly occurs at scale, from more macrocosmic overarching aspects of quality and condition to increasingly particular microcosmic conditions. See self-particularization, self-pluralization and self-referentiality.

Involution

Monads being unitary systems unto themselves cannot be affected by external influences, and the appearance of external influence would only occur when the cause of that influence is actually a motion internal to that monad, expressed objectively via monads and their relative monads. Hence affections directly describe and portray a monads relationship with reality and other monads. Therefore, the cause of the monads progressing inner condition, which is represented on the screen of space, is a kind of involutionary action; self-involvement. On scale of the One; Absolute; God, the primary Monad, it’s easy to see why all motion must be involutionary, because there is nothing external to God. Therefore, it follows that involution is the cause of developing conditions, change, form (the registration of conditions as an image) and time (the continued registration of the image of the condition relative to memory of past images).