In Ennead II.4 Plotinus anticipates Chris Langan's concept of syndiffeonesis with intelligible matter, at least to some capacity, seeing as intelligible matter is called for as a substrate to relate differentia in the way of plural Forms. The matter principle in question present to both the second and third hypostases acts not only a relational... Continue Reading →
Pythagoreanism: The Table of Opposites, NOUSLETTER III
As we all know well, Pythagoras and those in his tradition that followed, ground their metaphysics in number and had a well developed system of numerology, within the context of which each number is a particular system unto itself, each reflecting to various meanings relevant to the number in question. For example, the Dyad, a system of twoness, extends its meaning to indefiniteness, unlimitedness, ration in proportion, matter, gender and so on.
Nothing From Naught: On Ex Nihilo and Ex Deo, NOUSLETTER I
I've recently begun reinvestigating the divide between Creatio Ex Nihilo (creation from nothing) and Creatio Ex Deo (creation from God), initially, I had taken Creatio Ex Deo to be obvious. In response to the suggestion of something from nothing, I would say Ex Nihilo Nihil Fit; from nothing, nothing comes. In light of personal considerations, I aim to subject the two to a dialectical exercise, and resolve the contention precisely.
Primer on Metaphysics: Self-particularization and Self-definition
The system I'm putting forward starts with a few fundamental assertions made about the One/the Absolute, which is indeed maintained to be Absolute, which is essentially that which is totally universal (non-particular) and without privation. This is necessary for a foundational metaphysical principle, because if there is something external to it (which is the only... Continue Reading →
Plato and Aristotle: Theory of Forms vs. Hylomorphism
The essence of this point of contention between these two philosophical titans lies in the dynamics between the physical world and metaphysical principles underlying it. Both use the term "forms" to denote these kinds of metaphysical matrices, like the mould of an object, but not the object itself. In Platos theory of forms, he maintains... Continue Reading →
Plotinus Commentary: Ennead 5.9 Of Intelligence, Ideas and Essence
The Stoics are wrong in thinking that it is the Soul which, on reaching her perfection, begets Intelligence. How could that which is in potential pass into actualization unless there were some principle that effected the transition? Ennead 5.9 Plotinus herein argues against something arising from its total lack, while totally correct โ this astute... Continue Reading →
Plotinus Commentary: Ennead 3.1 Concerning Fate
In Concerning Fate, Plotinus targets both Stoic, Materialist and Astrological conceptions of causality. His argument against materialism is sound, that being the impossibility of the arrangement of atoms to form order in themselves, independent of an ordering agent, and the impossibility of such arrangements producing character in themselves over simply expressing that character. That being... Continue Reading →
Plotinus Commentary: Ennead 4.7 On the Immortality of the Soul
One faulty implication of Plotinus' here is that he maintains a principle distinction and truly duality between soul and body, rather than a monic dynamic. He holds that matter is merely fashioned by, and presumably possessed by soul, and is therefore maintained as a composite of matter and form until the soul departs (being the unifying principle between form and matter, a glue) and the matter disintegrates.
Plotinus Commentary: Ennead 1.6 Of Beauty
Plotinus believes beauty is recognition of soul expressed in the body, or form expressed within matter, given things can be recognized as more or less beautiful, he maintains soul can express itself in matter to greater or lesser degrees โ he believes this is possible because he maintains form and the stuff of matter to couple as a composite, ugliness he explains, is something of a failure of the stuff of matter to cohere to the form.
