Abraham’s Monopoly: A Semantic Imperialism

In both (a) Abrahamic apologetics, namely Christian and Islam apologetics, since Jews do not proselytize and (b) discourse between these Abrahamists and atheists, there is often a tacit acceptance that verity of theism-as-such naturally extends to the verity of the religion of the participant/interlocutor, this acceptance is (at least by appearances) also not foreign to the atheist participants. In fact, it almost works backwards as well, where arguments that are only specifically contra-God-as-X or perhaps specific to a religion specifically, also present their argumentation against God-as-X or the religion as something that supports their basis for atheism, counter-apologetics. Something like Christianity or Islam is not just theism-as-such, to verify either would require far more than an argument for theism. Though again, only tacit, what is being operated as though true is:

P1. If theism is true, Christianity is true. 
P2. Theism is true. 
∴ Christianity is true.

This argument is syntactically, that is structurally and logically, valid. Obviously however, premiss 1 is not sound, it’s a false premiss. When a premiss regards X and Y, and X and Y are not isomorphic, consideration must be given to each to determine whether the same conditions that lend verity or falsity to X do the same for Y. When the content of X and Y are identical, no argumentation is required to prove that any conditions for X and Y to be Z are the same, because the content is what determines the requisite conditions to begin with. However, as soon as the contents are differentiated, you no longer have this semantic privilege. Naturally, no one denies that theism and Christianity, a particular kind of theism, are identical, nor am I insisting that they do – only that with respect to arguments about the verity or falsity of theism, there is often an unsound extension of conclusions to either verification of Christianity or falsification of theism. These can both be true if the participating subjects are liable to treat a statement one way when explicit and treat something that implies that statement another way when non-explicit, which of course, they are, particularly when it’s a rhetorical convenience to do so.

Christianity requires more to be true than an affirmation of theism, something well understood in interfaith dialogues. It requires a specific God-concept to be true, it requires a participatory God capable of particularistic interactions to be true, it requires a specific historicity (and importantly, not just historicity-as-such) of Jesus to be true, it requires creatio ex nihilo, and, in the explicate logic of which, the design of the universe to not be suspended from the divine nature à la emanationism – so as to permit the interactive deity to override said designs to be true, and so on.

If, counter-apologetically but with implicit extension to rebuttal of theism, something specific to Christian theism is rebuked, likely pertaining to morality, then how is theism generically countered? It’s not, of course. This bears relevance to both Abrahamists and atheists, that generic theism survives criticism of Christianity, Islam and Judaism, nor does the justification of theism mutually include any more-specific form thereof.